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Abstract: This study compares organized labor’s reactions to changing management rhetorics as these rhetorics surrounded accounting-based incentive plans, including profit sharing. Results suggest
that labor’s perceptions of profit sharing changed dramatically from
the 1900-1930 period to post-World War II. The shift, in turn,
prompts an exploration of two research questions: (1) how and why
did the national labor discourse around the management rhetoric
and its emphasis on accounting information change, and (2) how
did this change render unions more governable in their support for
accounting-based incentive plans?

INTRODUCTION
Enthusiasm for profit sharing and other accounting-based
incentive plans made a resurgence in the U.S. during the 1990s
[Labate, 1993]. Management promoted profit sharing and other
accounting-based incentive plans as solutions to cyclical macroeconomic problems [Weitzman, 1984; Florkowski, 1991; Krase,
1993] and as techniques to facilitate union concessions [Perry
and Kegley, 1990]. This resurgence represented only the latest
wave of interest in accounting-based incentive plans in the U.S.
Studies show that interest in and enthusiasm for profit sharing
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have ebbed and flowed throughout the 20th century despite the
long-lived nature of some individual plans. The cyclical nature
of these accounting-based incentive plans, however, has been
ignored in some studies that have treated each profit-sharing
episode as unique and unrelated [Kubly, 1958; Jehring, 1960],
while other research treated episodes of profit sharing as if
they were basically the same [Cheadle, 1989; Aktoul, 1992]. We
argue that despite striking similarities between waves of profit
sharing, the contextual details surrounding each episode differ
dramatically. Further, we suggest that the management rhetorics used in advancing profit sharing and, in turn, labor unions’
responses to these management techniques and related rhetorics [Abrahamson, 1997] illustrate that accounting-based incentive plans are contextual, fluid phenomena, not unchanging and
instrumental management technologies.
Miller and O’Leary [1989], expressing this same concern as
to the interrelationship between management rhetoric and
management techniques in labor relations, emphasized the role
of language, rationales, and ideology in shaping social relations
among organizational and societal constituents. They argued
that it is necessary to examine the role of knowledge and expertise in order to understand the transformation of social relations among organizational actors, as well as the struggles that
attend these transformations. Their historical analysis suggested that society came to accept the hierarchies and managerial authority that influenced everyday life because both had
been rendered visible and knowable to external constituents.
Our paper seeks to extend Miller and O’Leary’s [1989] microanalysis concerning the constitution of the worker and the organization as visible, knowable, and, hence, governable entities.
Specifically, we examine the transformation of organized
labor’s resistance to, and then support of, profit sharing as a
component of workers’ compensation. Our study compares two
waves of profit sharing. In the first period, circa 1900-1925,
labor often resisted a management rhetoric that emphasized
accounting information as an objective, passive measure of
profit in accounting-based incentive plans. By contrast, in the
period following World War II, several large unions actively
supported accounting-based incentive plans, not only accepting
but promoting a management rhetoric of value-neutral accounting as unions demanded increased access to accounting
reports and relied increasingly on accounting information
within their own decision processes. This dramatic shift in
labor’s views pertaining to the management rhetoric of achttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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counting-based incentive plans, and the resultant shift in views
related to the acceptance of accounting-based incentives, suggests that it was not just the individual worker or organization
that was rendered governable [Miller and O’Leary, 1989].
Unions also became increasingly governable as they eventually
acquiesced to and took for granted the application of calculative regimes of accounting profit calculations.
THE MANAGEMENT RHETORIC OF PROFIT SHARING
Stryker [1990] argued that in arenas of frequent, inherent
conflict historical analysis can identify and elaborate upon the
selective institutional mechanisms that systematically contribute to the production, resistance to or acceptance of, and the
reproduction of organizational innovations such as accountingbased incentive plans. Such a perspective is also necessary to
understand the diffusion of these institutional patterns, particularly the manner in which social order is produced and reproduced in labor-management relations [Kolko, 1963; Stryker,
1990]. Stryker [1990] further suggested that because both functional and dysfunctional outcomes are achieved through conflict and because selective mechanisms include political-institutional dynamics, future research must provide comparative
historical perspectives on how, why, and in what context political-institutional mechanisms systematically combine to produce outcomes.
Consistent with this theme, Miller and O’Leary [1989] have
examined the process by which the existence of bureaucratic
hierarchies was reconciled with the American ideal of individual initiative. Their historical analysis suggested that individuals came to accept hierarchies and managerial authority
that influence everyday life as society became increasingly visible and knowable to external constituents. It is this quality of
knowability that became taken for granted or a fact of life in
contemporary society. Miller and O’Leary reasoned that the
interlinking of the corporation with the political culture was
essential to this process, such that the political culture provided
ideals favoring economy, efficiency, and science that were converted into “facts” concerning what are appropriate corporate
structures and professional managerial behavior. This “fact”based status had in turn been achieved by codifying related
structures and behaviors into an analyzed body of knowledge.
As Miller and O’Leary argued, the large-scale, multi-unit corporation was not uncritically welcomed into North American sociPublished by eGrove, 1999
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ety and neither was the authority of those who managed this
new economic form. They argued that new corporate managerial structures were not derived from arbitrary decrees of a
managerial elite nor did managerial authority come from privileged social positions. Instead, both managerial structures and
authority were both propagated by objective facts and techniques. Accounting became a significant forum for expressing
facts as it too became taken for granted as creating a visibility
of each organization’s and individual member’s performance.
Miller and O’Leary [1989, pp. 262-263] concluded that:
The principal implication of this paper is the proposition that critical studies of the modem corporation can
benefit from a more microanalytic concern with the
conditions of possibility of hierarchies. This entails an
analysis of the elementary components — intellectual,
cultural, institutional and technical practices [such as
accounting techniques] — out of which that complex
entity called the modern corporation has been constructed. . . . This is, in effect, a call for critical studies
of the corporation to work upwards from specific
processes and their interrelations, rather than downwards from an assumption that the outworkings of
power can be detected and made intelligible by
reference to a broad historical postulate such as that of
capitalist domination.
More specifically concerning management rhetoric and labor relations, Abrahamson [1997] argued that students of techniques for managing employees are generally unable to explain
the prevalence of different types of management rhetoric.
Abrahamson emphasized the importance of understanding the
role of rhetoric because the emergence of a particular form of
rhetoric may influence long-term macroeconomic trends,
rather than being merely a consequence of those trends. Rhetoric is constitutive. Furthermore, he argued that since employee
management rhetoric may greatly influence what managers do,
an understanding of forces influencing its role is an important
objective for research. For Abrahamson, understanding these
forces meant seeking a more complex and holistic picture that
included examining the role of government intervention in the
evolution of managerial rhetorics. Finally, Abrahamson conceded that his work represented a broad analysis of the role of
rhetoric over five periods in this century and urged a disaggregation of these periods be undertaken in order to gain a more
“fine grain” understanding of evolving managerial rhetoric.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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Consistent with Abrahamson’s call, our study compares
two waves of profit sharing — an early episode that occurred in
the first decades of this century and a second wave following
World War II. Specifically, we examine labor unions’ reactions
to, and impact upon, the management rhetoric surrounding
profit sharing and related accounting-based incentive plans
during these two time periods. Particularly important to our
analysis is Abrahamson’s [1997] distinction between two classes
of management rhetorics — “rational rhetoric” and “normative
rhetoric.” The key assumption underlying normative rhetoric is
that employers can render employees more productive by shaping their thoughts and capitalizing on their emotions. The key
assumption underlying rational rhetoric is that work processes
can be formalized and rationalized to optimize productivity, as
can the reward systems that guarantee recalcitrant employees’
adherence to these formal processes. Extending the work of
Jacoby [1985], Abrahamson identified the mid-1920s as the culmination of a normative rhetoric period that promoted company welfare practices, including financial incentives such as
profit sharing and employee-stock-ownership programs, that
were intended to align the objectives of employees with their
organization. Abrahamson argued that normative management
rhetoric involving such discourses as profit sharing tend to predominate because they promised to forestall the discontent that
causes employees to join labor unions and strike. Therefore, he
argued, the prevalence of normative rhetoric will be directly
related to the rise and vigor of labor union activity.
While Abrahamson and Jacoby placed profit sharing in the
mid-1920s as one form of normative rhetoric, our study suggests that these plans provide early glimpses of a shift to
rational managerial rhetoric as accounting is a central part of
rational management rhetoric. This focus places profit sharing
in a more complex light, evolving from the rational rhetoric of
the scientific management period prior to the mid-1920s.
Further, labor’s response to profit-sharing plans was a reaction
to both profit-sharing plans as normative techniques and
management’s appeal to accounting as a rational technique.
The critical point is that tools which have been interpreted
as either normative rhetoric or rational rhetoric are instead
evolving in their very nature. On this point, Baron et al.’s [1986]
study of the diffusion of scientific management indicated that
techniques associated with scientific management actually
fueled, rather than forestalled, unionization in many industries.
This argument is also consistent with the work of Barley and
Published by eGrove, 1999
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Kunda [1992], who concluded that the prevalence of rational
rhetoric managerial techniques was unsuccessful in early scientific management because the normative promise of labor
peace was clearly discredited over most of this period. In short,
our closer examination of profit sharing and allied management rhetoric in the early decades of the century goes beyond classifying it as a normative rhetoric of the 1920s, but sees
it as evolving to this status from an earlier status as a form of
rational rhetoric.
The emergence of accounting as a rational managerial
technique toward the end of the early decades of U.S. labor
unrest was a preamble to labor’s responses in the second period
we study. The second period we examine is a period of pervasive profit sharing that emerged following World War II. In
both periods, management rhetoric advocated profit sharing
and other accounting-based incentive plans as a solution to labor unrest. Furthermore, these plans were developed and
adopted in periods of “perceived” economic changes and crises.
Both periods are also marked by attempts to reconstitute workers as “cooperative participants” in production. However,
whereas in the first decades of the century labor often resisted a
management rhetoric advocating accounting-based incentive
plans on normative terms, in the period following World War II
many large unions actively embraced and pursued them. Thus,
in this latter period, many unions not only accepted the management rhetoric surrounding profit-sharing plans but began
also to accept and promote accounting as part of that management rhetoric. In this latter period, unions began to demand
increased access to accounting reports and relied increasingly
on accounting information for union decisions.
Indeed, our findings of a period of resistance followed by a
period of acceptance is consistent with Abrahamson’s recognition that rhetorics sometimes persist and even resurge in
later periods. Abrahamson also argued that historical events
such as wars and government intervention are also important
for understanding the influence and changes in management
rhetorics [Jacoby, 1985; Shenhav, 1995] — the focus of our
analysis.
In summary, our study is prompted by two major research
questions: (1) how and why did the national labor discourse
around the management rhetorics of profit sharing with its emphasis on accounting information change, and (2) how did this
change affect union support for, or opposition to, accountingbased incentive plans?
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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To answer these research questions, we examined accounting-based incentive plans from each of the two major periods.
Our study relies on both primary and secondary sources, including archival records, collective-bargaining agreements, letters from unions to company officials, and minutes from national and local union meetings [Cook and Reichardt, 1979].
We also examined the labor press from 1900 to 1970 extensively, reading selected labor papers in their entirety. The national labor press included journals and papers from the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO), the AFL-CIO in later years, and two national unions — the United Steel Workers of America (USWA)
and the United Rubber Workers (URW). In addition, we examined many newspapers published by the labor press of state or
union locals. We also documented what we did not find, for
example, where accounting was not mentioned [for a discussion of examining newspaper coverage in organizational analysis, see Allison, 1971; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Zelizer,
1992].
PROFIT SHARING IN THE EARLY PERIOD
According to Abrahamson [1997], the key assumption underlying normative rhetoric is that employers can render employees more productive by shaping their thoughts and capitalizing on their emotions. He characterized early normative
employee management rhetoric in the U.S. as evolving from
forms of industrial betterment, or welfare work, which was designed to shape employees’ values, intellectual skills, and work
ethics. By the mid-1920s, a normative rhetoric emerged which
promoted the use of welfare work techniques that incorporated
financial incentives such as profit sharing and related accounting-based incentive plans as part of the management techniques
intended to align the objectives of employees with the organization. The emphasis on cooperation in this period is illustrated
by the Spencer Wire Company plan of 1915:
The success or failure of the plan, therefore, is in your
hands. Our objective is several fold: The Company desires to interest you in its financial result, and is willing to share its profits. It hopes in return that the profits will be increased by employees taking a personal
interest in the continued success of the business, leading them to exercise the greatest possible care to prevent bad work and waste of time and material. Also to
encourage increased production and suggestions of imPublished by eGrove, 1999
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provement of any nature [employment contract in
Burritt et al., 1918, p. 271].
This excerpt illustrates that cooperation was not seen as a desired outcome for its own sake, but because it was expected to
increase productivity. Managers and owners of firms generally
cited four reasons for implementing accounting-based incentive
plans: 1) to make workers more concerned about costs and
careful about their work, 2) to increase efficiency, 3) to stabilize
the work force, and 4) to improve relations between management and employees [Engen, 1967]. Burritt et al.’s [1918, p. 18]
study was more specific. It listed “industrial unrest and agitation” as the major reason for growing interest in profit sharing,
stating: “Insurance against strikes is sought by limiting participation in profits to those who have been in continuous service
for a specified period, usually one year.”
During this early period, profit-sharing plans had other
common features, including the “continuous employment”
clauses. Plans were offered unilaterally by employers and could
be withdrawn at will or at the end of the fiscal year. Plans often
contained no language which specified how accounting profit
was to be computed (for example, how depreciation might be
handled). Most offered workers no recourse if they questioned
some aspect of the plan. Few gave employees the right to have
an outside auditor examine the profit figures. Furthermore,
these plans were often implemented as part of larger schemes
of “welfare capitalism,” as part of employers’ efforts to engineer
both the working and private lives of their workers [Jacoby,
1985]. Burritt et al. [1918] described over 50 profit-sharing
plans from that period. However, two of the most well-documented plans (Ford and McCormick) illustrate the role these
plans played in labor relations during the period.
For example, Henry Ford implemented his famous “Five
Dollar a Day” profit-sharing plan as part of a comprehensive
system of welfare capitalism introduced to reduce high levels of
absenteeism and turnover, to increase the pace of work, and to
counter threats of unionization. There were reasons to be concerned. In 1913, the company experienced an average of 10%
absenteeism. Turnover was 380% annually, which meant that
Ford had to hire 52,000 workers per year to keep 13,000 positions filled [Meyer, 1981]. Both Ford and his management
cadre believed workers needed to change their way of working.
Norval A. Hawkins, a manager at Ford, created a list of bad
habits that he felt welfare capitalism might improve. Workers

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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who needed improvement included “chronic strollers and time
killers,” “sulkers, grunters, backtalkers, mumblers,” “[those
with] antagonism to improved methods,” and “[those] doctoring records to suit the boss” [cited in Meyer, 1981, p. 741].
Henry Ford himself stated: “More than half the trouble in the
world today is the ‘soldiering’ and dilution and inefficiency for
which people are paying good money” [cited in Meyer, 1981,
p. 88).
Ford’s plan increased wages for all workers by 15% and
reduced the work day from nine hours to eight. Further, a portion of some workers’ compensation was based on the
company’s reported profits. After including profit sharing, the
maximum pay for some skilled workers could be as high as $5
per day (thus, the name of the plan). Only workers who performed well at work and who lived well at home could be recommended for participation in the plan. Floor supervisors
would decide who worked well, and inspectors from the firm’s
Sociology Department determined who lived well at home
[Benyon, 1973; Meyer, 1981].
Although the turnover and absenteeism decreased after the
introduction of welfare capitalism in 1913 and 1914, it does not
appear that profit sharing solved Ford’s labor problems or prevented unionization. In April 1919, the Auto Workers Union
struck Wadsworth Manufacturing who supplied Ford with auto
bodies. During the strike, over 700 Ford workers per day joined
the union. By 1920, 6,000 workers had quit working at Ford
Motor Company within a 90-day period [New York Times, November 25, 1920, p. 16]. In the same year, Ford distributed
bonuses to 94,000 workers which ranged from $50 to $270
[New York Times, December 31, 1920, p. 1]. In 1921, Ford canceled the plan entirely, stating that he was going to increase
wages instead, and that increased wages would make up for the
bonuses that workers were not going to receive [New York
Times, May 7, 1921, May 23, 1921]. Reverend Marquis, who
headed the welfare projects at Ford Motor Company, resigned.
His explanation demonstrates the normative rhetoric underlying these plans:
I resigned from the Ford Motor Company in 1921. The
old group of executives, who at times set justice and
humanity above profits and production, were gone.
With them, it seemed to me, had gone an era of cooperation and goodwill in the company. There came to
the front those whose theory was that men are more
profitable to an industry when driven than led, that
Published by eGrove, 1999
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fear is a greater incentive to work than loyalty [quoted
in Benyon, 1973, p. 39].
Similar to Ford Motor, difficult labor-management relations also preceded profit sharing at the McCormick Company
[Ozanne, 1967]. In 1903, McCormick introduced the company’s
first accounting-based incentive plan following a strike that occurred at a major division, the Chicago Deering Works. The
company tailored that plan so that workers needed one year
of “faithful employee” status to participate. The plan resulted
in stock distributions of around $300 to 700 production workers; in some cases, the $300 bonus equaled the employee’s
annual wages. Ozanne [1967] argued that the profit-sharing
plan slowed unionizing activity, especially after 20 union
activists, largely the organizers of the Chicago Deering Works
strike, were disqualified from the plan because they did not
satisfy McCormick’s “faithful employee” requirements. Cyrus
McCormick, Jr. stated that he believed that these types of plans
were a “very practical step toward removing any possible danger of Bolshevism” [Paper Series 4C, Box 6, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin]. However, as in the Ford Motor plan, the
stock distribution did not end labor-management problems at
McCormick. Union organizing continued at the plants. As the
wage agreement of 1903 approached expiration in 1904,
McCormick decided to lock the workers out rather than increase wages. Following a strike in 1913, a revised incentive
plan was implemented. This time, 63% of employees signed up,
but the plan did not solve McCormick’s labor problems. Workers went out on strike for 30 days in May 1916. The company
further revised this plan in 1920, but in the following year, the
company made so little profit that nothing was paid out. Eventually, all of the plans were destroyed by the low profits of the
1920s and, in particular, by the Great Depression, when
McCormick’s stock price dropped from $75 to below $16
[Ozanne, 1967, pp. 86-94].
Management Rhetoric and Union Resistance: Many union leaders opposed accounting-based incentive plans during this early
period [Kubley, 1958; Cheadle, 1989]. Throughout the labor
press, we found arguments against profit sharing that contended that profit sharing was introduced to prevent unionization. For example, the Detroit Labor News [August 29, 1919, p.
16] described profit-sharing plans as setting worker against
worker:

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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Shops that have unions do not have profit-sharing
plans. Most profit-sharing concerns pay lower wages
than prevailing union rates for the same work, and
profit sharing is adopted in most cases to prevent an
organization in the shop and to discourage agitation
for better conditions and lower hours.
The Wisconsin Labor Bulletin [May 26, 1916, p. 2] noted
that the McCormick Company had introduced its profit-sharing
plan two days before Christmas, reflecting a “paternalistic, benevolent despotism” that lay behind the plan. The paper stated,
“profit sharing schemes are a deception. They do not benefit
the great bulk of workers.” Similarly, the Cleveland Citizen
[January 10, 1914, p. 1] said that the Ford Motor Company’s
profit-sharing plan “vindicates the most radical union demands.” The article added:
While Ford’s scheme will be denounced as utopian, socialistic, etc. by other great capitalists and their newspapers, the general public will nevertheless be taught a
valuable lesson respecting the unequal distribution of
wealth now flowing into the coffers of the great corporations.
The Illinois State Federation of Labor [1918, p. 283] condemned profit sharing during its annual meeting, stating:
Many are the agencies that keep labor divided; politics
and religion, prejudice and selfishness, preferment and
flattery, are all ready weapons in their inexorable
grasp. But capital uses no more vicious agency against
the workers than the bonus system when used to prevent [union] organization.
As these quotations suggest, organized labor viewed accounting-based incentive plans as divisive measures used to
weaken union organizing activities. Throughout this early period, labor leaders also articulated multiple concerns about the
accounting basis of these plans. Three major themes emerged:
1) that accounting was not an objective, neutral activity and
was therefore not trustworthy; 2) that accounting was not relevant; and 3) that the assumptions underlying accounting were
debatable. In short, the critical point of resistance seemed to
hinge upon labor’s belief that accounting numbers could not be
trusted because these numbers were produced by companies
that could not be trusted. The Detroit Labor News [April 29,
1921, p. 2] observed:

Published by eGrove, 1999
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Dividing profits has a brotherly sound, but it means
nothing to those who know that the trust retains the
power to decide what constitutes profits, and the
skilled accountants can pile up the ‘debit’ side of the
ledger to any height desired.. Workers who accept the
trust’s bonus system play with loaded dice, because
corporation profits is a matter of figure jugglery in
which they have no part.
Articles explicitly cautioned workers not to believe the “figures” provided by owners and managers. The Detroit Labor
News [February 14, 1930, p. 6] stated:
When a corporation figures profits this does not mean
the total amount received, as with wages. Often skilled
accountants exhaust their ingenuity in disposing of income. There is only one way to secure a higher wage.
To win that, objective workers must organize and do
their own thinking. They would not accept the views of
the so-called economists who strive to maintain the
status quo. If these profits go unchallenged, a greater
concentration of wealth and pauperization of additional workers is inevitable.
The labor press criticized the way accounting profits were
calculated. For example, the Reading Labor Advocate complained about recording depletion as an expense. Instead, the
paper argued that both depletion and depreciation should be
deducted directly from the stockholders’ equity account. Further, the paper [March 6, 1926, p. 5] complained that companies used stock splits to hide profit. The Cleveland Citizen [December 29, 1923, p. 4] stated that it was impossible to police
the coal industry because there were so many changes in ownership that really represented only “bookkeeping transactions
which in many cases involve no physical possession.” The Detroit Labor News [August 17, 1923, p. 2] pointed out that the big
profits shown by the U. S. Steel Corporation were “after all
charges have been met and money set aside for improvement.”
This paper also noted that profits were “after fancy salaries and
the storing away of vast sums” [September 7, 1923, p. 2] and
that:
The fully sophisticated corporation ordinarily hides the
nature of this double charge [depreciation] by the
bookkeeping methods of capitalizing the surplus. Commercial methods of accounting are not capable of detecting the idleness of machinery. Bookkeepers,
whether dignified with resonant titles or not, are no
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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more than money clerks for men of money. They have
the dollar bias. They cannot think back from the dollar
to the man-machine combination [Detroit Labor News,
August 19, 1918, p. 4].
A second argument prominent in the press was that accounting reports and measures were not relevant to the important issues of the day. They argued that accounting numbers
could play no significant role in social debates that involved
issues of fairness, morality, and ethics. Some segments of labor
viewed the use of accounting calculations as incompatible with,
or at least inadequate for, dealing with (normative) issues of
fairness. For example, the Cleveland Citizen [May 8, 1920, p. 3]
questioned the extensive use of such metrics as accounting
numbers in the debates over railroad strikes. “The whole question of work and wages has a political as well as an economic
aspect, and it is quite likely that this fact will become fully
understood by American Labor.” Other segments of labor argued that workers deserved a “living wage” not a wage based on
a company’s profits. For example, the Detroit Labor News [September 7, 1923, p. 2] commented that a “just and reasonable
wage” should not be based purely on profit:
On the basis of a living wage workers have something
to figure from. The cost of supporting an average family in average comfort can be determined with a fair
degree of accuracy. But a just and reasonable wage,
what is it? From past action of the [coal] board, we
would be justified in assuming that it is one that is
entirely satisfactory to the railroad owners.
The arguments of the labor press often stressed the moral
and ethical issues that organized labor felt were more important than the measure of accounting profit. The United Automobile, Aircraft, and Vehicle Workers of America asked in an
article entitled “What is a Fair Wage?”:
A decision always proves to be a truce, a compromise.
In fact, no final and permanent decision can be
reached because there is no finality in the worker’s
ethical standard. And there is no finality to the opposition to concessions made by the capitalist. For this reason, these struggles will always be camouflaged with
an ethical appeal. The capitalist cannot resort to the
ethical argument unless he is on the average of bankruptcy, and can thus resort to the feelings of his advisors. As a rule, he seldom has this argument and is
forced by the very nature of things to discuss bookPublished by eGrove, 1999

13

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 8
146

Accounting Historians Journal, December 1999

keeping, profits, interest, loans, new equipment and
dividends. He thus appears heartless and callous, immune from higher appeal. The fact is that he would
resort to the ethical appeal if he could and he does so
when the conditions of business are such that he can
do so without detection. The ethics of this whole matter can never be square with economic conditions until
society becomes organized on a basis of equitable production [Auto Worker, October 19, 1919, p. 9].
In this period of struggle and conflict, the mutable nature
of accounting information appears to have been clear to some
segments of organized labor, who challenged both the basic
assumptions underlying the use of accounting measurements
and the accounting measurements themselves. Importantly, the
economic information which provides the foundation for accounting-based incentive plans was not being viewed as an acceptable form of discourse; thus, its power to transform social
values was limited [Edelman, 1977; Clegg, 1987]. In a particularly vehement example of this, the Federation of Labor Press
of Detroit argued that labor should never accept the rules and
arguments of capital:
When the purchased chattel of capital strangles his
honest conviction to become defenders of the rules and
terms established by employers to enslave labor and to
raise barriers against the worker entrenching himself
behind breast-works of the labor movement, he dips
his prostituted pen into the repulsive slime of calumny
[Detroit Labor News, January 9, 1918, p. 4].
Finally, some of labor’s resistance centered on the assumptions underlying “accounting” as it had been conceptualized
and practiced. These critiques focused on the use of exchange
value rather than labor production values as the only acceptable representation of value. New Solidarity, the paper of the
International Workers of the World (IWW), often made this
point, but the issue was also discussed in the papers of the
Detroit Federation of Labor [Detroit Labor News, August 17,
1923, p. 2, January 21, 1921, p. 21; Labor Compendium of St.
Louis, February, 1905, p. 2].
The strongest challenge to the accounting assumptions
came from the most radical newspapers. The IWW often encouraged workers to gather their own information about productive processes so that they would be ready to run the
economy after capitalism had been destroyed. When they accomplished this, it was argued, the existing accounting system
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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would also be destroyed. In its place, buying and selling would
be on the basis of labor involved. Each worker would receive a
“labor” passbook. In this way, the IWW believed that no “capitalist robbery based on wage labor would be possible [One Big
Union Monthly, June 1919, p. 25].
In addition, the IWW seemed to recognize how deeply certain structures of business interest were embedded within existing accounting practices (e.g., the use of market-based exchange values). The union argued that is was dangerous to
account for things in a way inconsistent with the social structures they were trying to build. During the early 1920s, the
union tried to implement an accounting system that would not
“give a false nature” to the organizational structure that would
be in place and working when the IWW succeeded in overthrowing capitalism. In addition, the IWW believed that accounting should be done by everyone, and not be an exercise of
knowledge of just a few. ‘Therefore, the union recommended
that thousands of workers be trained to do accounting in a new
way; that is, based on labor values [New Solidarity, April 19,
1920, p. 1].
More Moderate Union Reaction: While accounting-based incentive plans were frequently rejected by labor groups during the
early 1900s, there were other more reformist union groups
which were competing with the more radical federations of labor [Galenson, 1960; see also Michael and Nelson, 1998]. This
more reformist discussion of capitalism and labor-management
relations began to focus on the Progressive movement discourse
of expertise, rationalization, and quantitative measurement
[Kolko, 1963; Larson, 1977; Stryker, 1990; Covaleski and
Dirsmith, 1995]. For example, the American Federationist, the
monthly journal of the AFL, reflected the more moderate views
of labor-management relations of Samuel Gompers, William
Green, and the editors of the journal. Because the major goal of
the AFL was to obtain a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work,”
the AFL’s struggles became focused on defining a “fair day’s
work.” Gompers stated in an interview that organized labor
“demanded no special favors, no old-age pensions, no socialistic
legislation. They only want justice” [American Federationist, December 1908, p. 1057], and this “justice” now meant fair wages
instead of a living wage. Furthermore, the AFL used the language of the Progressive movement, stressing education, both
industrial and physical, and cooperation between labor and
management as social solutions to industrial problems. For exPublished by eGrove, 1999
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ample, William Green restated the AFL’s support for cooperation in an editorial entitled “Team Play” which noted that the
United States Chamber of Commerce’s annual conference
stressed industrial peace:
The newer idea is that profits are due to superior management and that cooperation of all concerned in a
producing establishment is necessary to make better
management effective. The former president of the
Chamber of Commerce, Lewis Pierson, made a most
powerful appeal for ‘Team Play’ for ‘Prosperity,’ looking to a not distant day when organized business,
organized labor and a comprehending government
shall unite for the intelligent team work that alone can
solve our newer problems [American Federationist, July
1928, p. 32].
In short, the AFL argued for industrial cooperation based on
effective and efficient participation of citizens who were well
educated and in good health. Expertise and science would play
a role, as would a progressive government. In this context, the
battle over efficiency was often reduced to a discussion of
measurement. An explicit discussion of this came in 1925 in an
editorial entitled “The Industrial Measuring Rod.” The editorial
stated:
How difficult it was to convince, even in industry that
is in advance of many in keeping records as steel, of
the superior efficiency of the shorter workday indicates
how few standards for measuring the result of personal
policies have thus been developed. By promoting a
stable personnel organization, not only are the turnover costs eliminated, but the economies of more efficient production become a very considerable factor. It
is difficult for a business management to visualize such
results and for the trade unions to supply factual data.
But it is important that such data and measuring rods
be available to not only the industry but the public to
evaluate policies. To develop such standards is primarily the function of management and engineers.
Workers can and would be glad to help under proper
provisions [Cleveland Citizen, August 19, 1925, p. 1].
The labor press in the 1920s illustrated the tensions emerging between those who sought to fundamentally change or
eliminate capitalism and those primarily interested in securing
a share of the growing industrial wealth by invoking expertise,
science, and the search for efficiency which characterized the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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Progressive movement [Hays, 1959; Haber, 1964; Miller and
O’Leary, 1989]. The Detroit Labor News, one of the presses most
critical of accounting and profit sharing a few years earlier,
provided an excellent example of this tension. In 1929, the paper ran several front-page articles promoting industrial peace
through cooperation and advocating the use of expertise, calculation, and science. Yet, on this same page an article entitled
“Trade Unionism Fits into American Ideal” [December 20, 1929,
p. 1] warned:
This historic opposition to trade unionism takes a new
form as old methods are exposed. This opposition can
be expected because trade unionism rejects man’s control of man. The crude opposition of by-gone-days —
Pinkerton detectives, militia and regimented armies of
strikebreakers — has been replaced by cunning and
stealth. Our present day opponents have discovered
that the most effective way to control workers is to
control the mind.
In summary, in this period of labor unrest, labor viewed
accounting as neither immutable nor neutral. While many businesses and some levels of government turned to arguments
couched in accounting and other administrative language, labor challenged both the morality of underlying institutions of
capitalism and the representations of these institutions provided by management or its accounting vassals (specifically,
their representations of profit). As demonstrated in the above
excerpts, the early decades of the century were a time of pronounced struggle over accounting as discourse, as well as over
wages and working conditions. Accounting was described as
the province of owners and managers who could not be trusted.
Further, the labor press described the accounting reports as
representing the perspectives and interest of owners and managers.
PROFIT SHARING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II
The second wave of accounting-based incentive plans began before World War II, increasing dramatically after the war.
Studies usually list two legislative and one managerial reasons
for the increased usage of these incentive systems. First, tax
laws were changed, creating a more hospitable climate for
profit sharing. Second, most profit-sharing and gain-sharing
plans were exempted from the U.S. government’s wage stabilization policies following World War II [Thompson, 1949;
Published by eGrove, 1999
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American Federationist, July 1950; Knowlton, 1954a,b] Third,
studies have suggested that management wanted to create incentives to tie workers’ interests to the firm, sometimes phrased
as “making our people capitalists” [Council on Profit Sharing
Industries, 1954; Knowlton, 1954a,b; Jehring, 1960]. As with
the earlier wave, managers sometimes described accountingbased incentive plans as means of improving the flaws and
shortcomings of workers. For example, a manager from the
Quality Casting Company, which introduced profit sharing in
1945, stated:
One example of getting people to assume responsibility
is one of which we are very proud. We have a lot of
colored boys [sic] working for us. Several years ago we
were able to encourage a couple of them to take the
money that they had received from profit sharing and
start building or providing a home for themselves. Of
course, it changed their outlook on many things, and
particularly at work, it made them far more responsible. That was what we wanted to do. [Council on
Profit Sharing Industries, 1954, p. 106].
Worker loyalty and responsibility was valued because managers thought these incentives would create workers who were
attentive to costs, efficient, and willing to accept new technology [Thompson, 1949; Knowlton, 1954a,b; Jehring, 1960]. In
particular, accounting-based incentive plans were often implemented to decrease labor conflict over engineering-based piece
rates and work rules [Oakes and Covaleski, 1994] as evidenced
in such places as a gain-sharing plan at Kaiser Steel’s Fontana,
Califonia plant [Monthly Labor Review, April 1964; Steel Labor,
July 1964]; at Quality Castings Company [Jehring, 1960]; at
LaPointe Machine Tool Company [Schultz and Crisara, 1948];
at Parker Pen [“Parker Pen Memoranda,” 1954]; and at American Motors Corporation [Kenosha Labor, August 3, 1961, October 6, 1961, October 12, 1961].
These post-World War II profit-sharing and gain-sharing
plans differed from their counterparts in the early decades of
the century. Many plans were implemented as part of collective
bargaining rather than being unilaterally implemented by management as in the prior era. Further, most allowed at least some
redress over accounting issues. Most gain-sharing plans and
many profit-sharing plans instituted specific means for union/
management cooperation. These mechanisms often took the
form of committees (e.g., the Progress Sharing Committees at
Kaiser and the Scanlon Committee at Parker Pen). Further,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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these plans often used the rhetoric of “teamwork” to advocate
their agendas [Thompson, 1949; Knowlton, 1954a,b; Jehring,
1960].
The second wave of profit sharing received union support
which was widely accomplished by favorable commentary in
the labor press [American Federationist, July 1950; Zalusky,
1991]. In addition, the labor press of the post-World War II
period reflected a change in labor’s views of accounting. These
changes are illustrated both directly and indirectly. For example, organized labor no longer resisted the use of measurement, regulation, and formalistic solutions to labor/management disputes. In fact, union discussions of “productivity” and
labor’s “fair share of its fruits” promoted the use of formulabased bargaining [c.f., American Federationist, November 1949,
p. 16; Voice of Local 212, January 1951, p. 4]. The AFL press
continued to argue that it was important to end antagonistic
relationships between labor and management and to bargain
cooperatively. The American Federationist [July 1950, p. 18], for
example, stated: “The practical use of union-management cooperation is, we think, indispensable to best results.” The monthly
journal of the USWA also editorialized favorably about cooperation, noting:
Something new in the field of labor-management relations is taking place in steel communities around the
country. The president of the nation’s largest union
and the chairman of the biggest steel producer in the
world are digging into labor problems at the plant level
[Steel Labor, December 1959, p. 18].
Other labor leaders also began to express similar views; for
example, the URW executive committee called for “careful cooperation” with the Big Four rubber companies [URW Convention Proceedings, February 1948, p. 29].
The labor press also began to discuss accounting earnings
more frequently to advocate for labor. Local and national labor
newspapers began reporting accounting-based profit figures
routinely. These reports included sales figures in dollars, and
annual and quarterly earnings statements taken directly from
the business press. Many reports were taken verbatim from the
Wall Street Journal. Union leaders appealed to these earnings
figures to justify wage demands. For example, Philip Murray of
the CIO stated:
Demands of this union for a wage increase and other
improvements in our basic steel contracts are economiPublished by eGrove, 1999
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cally right, economically feasible and entirely justifiable. No propaganda appeals by the steel companies to
the public can hide the fact that the present profit margin of the steel industry is so great it could easily grant
the union’s demands without raising prices at all [Steel
Labor, February 1952, p. 1].
In another example, Walter P. Reuther of the United Auto
Workers of America (UAW) sent a letter to Chrysler following a
99-day strike in 1950 that said:
Despite the 1949 record profits of $213 million, the
Chrysler Corporation was unwilling to grant its workers the same reasonable demands which other companies granted.
Chrysler lacked the simple, common decency to
share the profits with workers [Voice of Local 212, May
1950, p. 3].
During this period unions often called for more accounting
information. This increased use of accounting came from both
labor’s demands to see the books and from management’s insistence that labor take financial arguments seriously. For example, during the 113-day strike at General Motors during
1955-1956, one of the UAW’s central demands was for the company to “open the books” to determine if a raise was feasible.
When General Motors refused, President Harry Truman set up
a “fact-finding committee” which found that a wage increase
was reasonable. General Motors still refused to grant a raise,
and the strike went on two months after the committee’s report
was issued. Workers on the picket line carried signs that called
on General Motors to let the public “see the facts.” [UAW, 1985,
p. 50]. This call for accounting information was echoed by
union leaders in the May 1949 edition of the Journal of
Accountancy.
The most prominent union figure calling for profit sharing
was Walter P. Reuther, head of the UAW. In early 1958, the
Executive Board of the UAW added profit sharing to its list of
bargaining demands. The UAW membership was divided and
ultimately dropped this demand at its 1958 convention, deciding to focus on decreasing the work week in order to solve
mounting unemployment [Voice of Local 212, February 1958,
December 1958]. However, Reuther continued to push for
profit sharing as a “way to solve serious and growing economic
problems.” In an interview on the CBS [March 23, 1958] program, “Face the Nation,” Reuther stated that:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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The prime economic motivation behind our profit
sharing plan is our desire to find a way by which wage
earners at the bargaining table can achieve their equity, their measure of economic and social justice, on a
basis that will be absolutely, positively non-inflationary
in character.
When asked how serious the UAW was in its demand for profit
sharing, Reuther answered, “We are dead serious.” Additionally, Reuther called for profit sharing again in 1963 when he
stated: “Profit sharing is rational because it shares a pie that’s
already baked.” He called on industry to get “emotionally adjusted” to the idea. Reuther’s argument that profit-sharing
plans are a reasonable way to divide up the fruits of labor
reflects his acceptance of accounting as a measure of productivity and as a basis for determining labor’s “fair share” [Solidarity, February 1963, p. 3].
In some sense, what was not said in the labor press reflects
organized labor’s views as much as what was said. There were
few examples of labor’s earlier criticisms of accounting in terms
of its being untrustworthy, irrelevant, or political. Gone was the
critique of accounting numbers based on market-based exchange values rather than labor theory values to represent economic reality. Further, the labor press contained no discussions
of the morality of using numbers to discuss social issues.
With few exceptions, the labor press did not question the
manner in which financial reports were prepared. We found
only two explicit complaints about accounting, both in the
Voice of Local 212. In the first example, the union complained
that the annual financial statements of Briggs Manufacturing
did not give the union credit for the improved working conditions [November 1949, p. 2]. In the second example, the paper
[May 1951, p. 2] stated: “Companies try to make profit look
smaller by sometimes talking about net profit and other times
about gross profits. This confuses people.” When asked to speak
to accountants, labor leaders did complain about some accounting practices [Gomberg, 1947], but these concerns were
no longer part of labor’s own press.
On the other hand, both profit-sharing and gain-sharing
plans involved increasingly complicated formulas and calculations. For example, the profit-sharing plan at American Motors
involved problematic financial reporting issues including, at
one point, removing extraordinary gains and losses and deducting earnings from foreign investments and licenses [New York
Times, October 13, 1964, p. 23]. The plan at Kaiser Steel
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required that “actual costs” be compared to a baseline measure
of costs established in 1961. The difference between the two
would be multiplied by the tons of steel finished that month,
and then any new equipment that “improved productivity” was
subtracted at a rate of 1/6 of the cost per month. At Parker Pen,
the Scanlon plan allowed the bonus ratio to be adjusted for
changes in product mix, subcontracting, or technology — all
items which created significant measurement problems
[“Parker Pen Memorandum,” 1954]. In other words, plans often
involved particular accounting issues that could be points of
conflict, even if unions accepted the basic premises underlying
the accounting system.
In summary, this second period reveals the extent to which
debates had shifted from moral issues (including the appropriate definition and boundaries of labor conflict) to debates of
fact (how do we measure productivity, what are true profits).
This shift reflects, in large part, the way that the rhetoric of
organized labor was subsumed by the rhetoric of rationality
[Zucker, 1977; Gordon et al., 1982; Jacoby, 1985]. It also reflects the widespread trend toward specialization of expertise
and knowledge in which unions came to depend on the accounting measures and the expertise of nonunion sources like
the Wall Street Journal, in which union leaders spoke about
accounting issues with accountants but not with the rank and
file. The structural changes in the relationship between labor
and management, reflected in both the labor press and in
organized labor’s discussion of cooperation, were rapidly consolidated in the post-war period. Gordon et al. [1982, p. 188]
remarked on the rate of this transformation in this way:
In retrospect, the speed and comprehensiveness of
unions’ postwar accommodation with management in
the new system of labor management appear quite remarkable. By the early 1950’s, large corporations had
succeeded in shaping and applying an essentially new
structure of labor management.
DISCUSSION
The two waves of accounting-based incentive plans examined in this study shared a number of important features. In
both periods, employers instituted these plans to deal with labor problems. Plans in both periods were couched in terms of
“cooperation” and in terms of creating responsible, efficient,
loyal employees. They were intended to relocate or recreate the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/8
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employee into a governable working subject [Townley, 1994].
Significant differences existed, however, including organized
labor’s changing views of the plans. As accounting measurement is an integral part of these plans, labor’s changing views
of accounting are reflected in their altered stance toward profit
sharing and other incentive plans.
The labor press of the first era examined offers many examples where labor writers and leaders felt confident in critically commenting on the nature and practice of accounting.
Labor papers also discussed relatively complex business transactions (e.g., stock splits) with little hesitancy. Further, these
conversations occurred within the labor press itself, suggesting
that union organizers and leaders expected this critique to be
understandable and important to union members. Often accounting was described in terms of the biased reports of owners
whose interests opposed the interests of workers. In addition,
the more radical presses argued that union members must
learn to do accounting themselves. Following World War II,
however, the labor press seldom commented on accounting as a
practice. Further, when it reported accounting profits, the press
frequently attributed its information to the Wall Street Journal
and other sources from the business press that were ostensibly
independent of employers. Accounting information began to
fall outside the focus and core competencies of unions and the
labor press.
Impact of Government Intervention and the Triumph of Rationality: As noted earlier, the seeds of transition from normative
management rhetorics to rhetorics of rationality were planted
early in the 20th century. The change did not come to fruition,
however, until organized labor’s normative resistance to management technologies was overcome. This happened, in large
part, because of the New Deal legislation of the 1930s. This
legislation instituted a broad federal bureaucracy that affected
labor relations in a number of ways. Authors, including Stryker
[1990], Jacoby [1985], and Gordon et al. [1982], have discussed
the role of the Wagner Act and the National Labor Relations
Board at length. For this study, federal labor legislation was
important for several reasons. The legislation institutionalized
and legislated the right to bargain collectively. As a result, it
diminished one of labor’s primary reasons for opposing profit
sharing; namely, that these plans prevented organizing. Perhaps
more importantly, this legislation rationalized the arena of
bargaining, giving rise to several important implications. This
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legislation normalized and bureaucratized the employee and
employer relationship. The relationship of worker and boss was
no longer seen as fraught with the “moral” and “ethical” conflicts featured so prominently in the earlier labor press [Jacoby,
1985]. Following the New Deal, this relationship was legislated
into one relationship to be accepted, managed, and negotiated,
but not overthrown. In other words, the relationship became
technical. Labor debates moved from issues of substantive rationality (the proper goals to pursue) to issues of instrumental
rationality (how to obtain higher wages and better working
conditions). As such, the moral discourse underlying labor opposition to both profit sharing and accounting was preempted.
In addition, the New Deal legislation may have influenced
labor’s views of accounting by standardizing and formalizing
accounting and other issues of corporate government through
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. The formation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formalized accounting in such a way that the rules for accounting were relocated outside of the firm, seemingly away from the manipulation of owners or managers. Furthermore, “professionalization”
meant that accounting increasingly became the bailiwick of
“experts” who were located outside the corporation and who
appeared to be independent. The effects of both events were
reflected in the labor press’ reports of accounting in the 1940s
and 1950s, when unions actively gathered accounting information and reported that information, implying that this information was uncontested. As we noted previously, the labor press in
the early period often described accounting as representing the
vested interests of owners, rather than being the disinterested,
value-neutral reports of professionals. For example, accounting
professionals were described by the press as “the money clerks
for men of money” [Detroit Labor News, August 19, 1918]. The
legislation of corporate financial reporting practices, along with
the growing professionalization of accounting, created an image of impartiality for accountants [Larson, 1977; Miranti,
1990]. Just as the New Deal labor legislation changed the relationship between employees and employers, the professionalization of accounting relocated labor in terms of accounting.
Increasingly, the labor press did not describe accounting as the
biased reports of an enemy, nor even the prerogative of labor,
but as “authorless” information.
We are not, however, arguing that organized labor believed
every accounting report presented to them in this later period.
As Stryker [1990] pointed out, bureaucratic information can be
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used to manage conflict even if there is disagreement about the
information and even if the information is seen as politicized.
In order to reduce conflict, the administrative use of information expertise need only be seen as not systematically and universally biased. For Stryker, this meant that information may
not illuminate class conflict; it cannot appear to be class-dominated or inherently interest-based. In our study, this means that
labor must not see accounting information as inherently biased
in favor of management or, ironically, biased in favor of unions.
In other words, many people including labor came to believe
that while accounting reports could be wrong (that is, reports
could be manipulated if management did not follow the rules),
accounting reports, prepared by rules established by the SEC
and the profession, could also be trustworthy or, more importantly, useful.
It is difficult to differentiate the growth of accounting and
auditing regulation and professionalization from a similar
trend that occurred in the regulation and bureaucratization of
labor unions. These two trends happened in tandem and, we
argue, are part of the same push for rationalization that was
embraced by managers and unions. It is equally important to
note that neither trend began in the 1930s with the New Deal
legislation. As noted earlier in this paper, management rhetorics of rationalization and labor’s acceptance of these rhetorics
appear and disappear in the first decades of the 20th century.
However, these rhetorics did not predominate. In the same
sense, although accounting was growing in importance
(Hawkins, 1986; Vangermeersch, 1986), accounting was not
viewed by labor as a body of expertise that should be automatically rejected.
In many ways, this accommodation reflects organized
labor’s acquiescence to the tenets of the Progressive movement,
tenets that large segments of labor had rejected in the early
decades of the century. During the period of rejection, labor
argued that the labor/management relationship was an issue of
moral, and not technological debate. As such, accounting measures neither reduced conflict nor created the stability and predictability that Kolko [1963] and others argued lay at the heart
of the Progressive movement [Hays, 1959; Haber, 1964]. Nor
did the use of accounting measurement shift political and
moral conflicts into arguments about fact, a goal central to the
Progressives of the period and to the New Deal legislative solutions that were to follow. In other words, the use of administrative techniques like accounting-based incentive plans in the
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early period did not reduce or change the nature of labor conflict [Stryker, 1990].
Following the New Deal, however, the opposite was true.
Legislative solutions provided a political culture and context
that viewed accounting-based incentive plans as objective and
immutable, thus appearing more legitimate. Within this context, profit sharing came to be supported and perpetuated by
organized labor itself, thus establishing shared meanings of organizational behavior and changing the structure of labor-management conflict. With this complicity of organized labor,
unions themselves were rendered governable as were labormanagement relations as the calculative regime of accounting
was increasingly accepted and applied.
Closing Comments: It is difficult to determine the effects of
organized labor’s call for and participation in profit sharing
even after almost half a century. Some labor historians suggest
that the decisions made by organized labor during this period
profoundly affected the future of industrial unions as a force in
the U.S. For example, Kessler-Harris and Silverman [1992, p.
62] stated:
Continuing to seek a middle-class lifestyle for their
members, unions tried to achieve the appearance of
upward economic mobility within a job context that
was still circumscribed. In the skilled craft unions the
result was a job protectionism that subjected them to
attack by a growing civil rights movement and reduced
the credibility of the labor movement as a moral voice
for less privileged workers.
Although those promoting the 1990’s wave of accountingbased incentive plans often couched these plans in terms of
cooperation, participation, and team work, the plans also appeared in plants facing imminent closure [Perry and Kegley,
1990]. In the uncertain and complex environment in which
these plans were implemented, it seemed increasingly important that unions be able to question the accounting reports of
falling profits that often underlie calls for organizational restructuring. However, the ability of unions to confront increasingly complex and difficult accounting and other technical issues has been called into question. For example, Craypo and
Nissen [1993, p. 234] contended that unions have sometimes
been unable to anticipate or understand corporate strategies for
reorganization. They noted: “It is revealing that the first person
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other than a manager or investment specialist to know that
White Consolidated planned to divest the Balw-Knox foundry
was neither a local nor an international union official but a
Calumet Project researcher who had read about the plan in the
business press.”
Some labor leaders agreed that unions often lack information about corporate plans or alternative solutions to economic
problems. They note that the labor press has been weakened,
and that the general media provides little coverage of union
issues [Pizzigati and Soloway, 1992]. In the end, organized
labor’s acceptance of financial accounting and other rationalized management practices may have limited the ability of
workers to respond imaginatively and critically to the normative challenges of global economic restructuring.
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